

Crafting An Effective Security Organisation

QCon NYC 2015

Rich Smith (@iodboi)

Etsy

\$ whoami

- Rich Smith - Brooklyn, NYC
- Director of Security at Etsy
- Co-Founder of Syndis in Reykjavík, Iceland
- Background in breaking not building: Vuln Research, Exploit Dev, Pen-Testing, Attack Framework Dev ...

Etsy Who?

- etsy.com - Craft and vintage marketplace
- Gross Marketplace Sales (GMS) \$1.93 Billion in 2014
- 20.8M active buyers, 1.4M active sellers*
- Buying & selling from almost every country in the world
- Offices in 7 countries*, HQ in Brooklyn NYC
- 717 Full Time Employees*, 14 in the tech security team


Focus Of Today

- **Lessons Learnt & Where We Came From**
- **Security Mindset & Motivations**
- **Fostering & Growth of Security Culture**

Disclaimer

A + B \neq Culture

Security from 50,000 ft



Technology

Security

Society

From this perspective it's easy
to see that **people** need to be
considered alongside
technology for effective
security

Security Ego

It doesn't diminish your security cred to value people as much as technology, it just means you will have greater **impact & effectiveness.**

You will have more tools to work with.


Etsy Engineering Culture

(Some) Core Engineering Principles

- Empower the edges
- Trust but verify
- 'If it moves graph it' - Let the data lead you
- 'Just Ship' - Get things done
- **Every** engineer can push to prod at any time

**What does Continuous
Deployment at Etsy look
like?**

Pushes Per Day




Very end of 2009

Today

Etsy

@iodboi



Operator

Config flags

Metrics



#monitoring






white dresses for children
printable bri
couple sweaters
furniture wax
shii
bridal hair comb
whimsical metal art

Last deploy : production
• 4th (3rd prod + 1st config)
• mherandez + 1 others.
• Took 11 min, 17 sec
• Princess QA: 1 min, 11 sec
• Prod QA: -
• Wait time: -
• 4 commits - 42.9% dark
• 28 Insert - 20 deletions

amorrison
on prod
1m since 10:39

rbateman
qa-config tests are running...
3m since 10:38



But how do you 'security'
this anarchy?

In such an environment
classical security approaches
don't apply well

Classical == Restrictions

Classical == Blocking

If Security introduces
blocking to the org, it will be
ignored, not embraced

Continuous Deployment & Security

- The lessons & tools from **DevOps** are directly applicable
- Apply the same **'if it moves graph it'** for security events
- Makes security related data available to everyone
- With CD, no such things as 'out of cycle' patches
- **Security engineers** push fixes directly to production

'DevOpsSec'


.... Or

'Lessons Security can
learn from DevOps'

DevOps

- 'DevOps' has become somewhat overloaded
- Aim: Remove **silos** & organizational **blockers** between Ops and Developers
- Central to this focus on good **Communication** & **Collaboration**

'DevOpsSec'



- Natural extension of DevOps
- Security faces many of the same challenges as Ops does/did
- Remove barriers between Security, Developers and Ops

The time when a single person or team can be responsible for an orgs security is long over....

...it is up to **EVERYONE**

Security as a Blocker

- Lazy and plain 'bad' security teams default to blocking
- Blocking makes Security a **NOP** in the CD world
- You **will** be ignored and teams **will** work around you
- **No's are a Finite Resource** - use them wisely

Security as a Enabler

- Assisting teams to do their new crazy ideas - securely
- Chase solutions to difficult challenges
 - If your security engineers don't like hard problems and novel solutions you have the wrong ones
- **Incentivises** proactive engagement with Security

Designated Hackers

- Security engineers assist multiple teams
- 'Designated' not 'Dedicated'
- Breaks down barriers, build **trust & relationships**
- Represent teams **back** to security
- Early visibility, input & deeper insight

**'You're only a blocker if
you're the last to know'**

John Allspaw,
Some meeting room, somewhere at Etsy

Principles of Effective Security

3 Principles of Effective Security

1. Enabling
2. Transparent
3. Blameless

Enabling

A security team's success
should be measured by what
they **enable** not by what
they **block**

Transparent

A security team that is **open**
as to **what** it does, and **why**,
spreads understanding and
is **embraced**

Blameless

Security failures **will**
happen, only without blame
will you be able to
understand the **true** causes

Progressive Security Culture

Progressive Security Culture

- Understanding that security is as much of a **people** problem as a technology problem
- As an industry, security has done a poor job of discussing the **need** for positive security culture
- Often approaches focussed on are **entirely** technical
- Great culture depends on great people



Security Team Hiring

Number 1 rule

Don't Hire Assholes

Security Team Hiring

If you inadvertently do, or you inherit one.....

Remove them ASAP

Great culture needs great people

- Abrasive members will be the single biggest factor **undermining** your progressive security efforts
- Value social skills as highly as technical skills when making your security hires
- **'Cultural fit'** critically important

The **more** diverse a security team, the
more approachable it will be to **more**
people

Security Outreach

- Distinct from security education
- Focus on building **relationships**
 - Removes barriers / reduces intimidation
- Can be as simple as buying cakes or beer!
- Assign budget to this, it will be the best ROI you see

‘Sociable conversation is the **inevitable** product of socializing. Sociable conversation is the way that human beings establish **trusted** relationships among themselves’

Cory Doctorow - Information doesn't want to be free

Security Candy!



- Biggest source of security pod 'drive bys'
- IRC bot command so people can see what's in stock
- Graph consumption!

Bootcamps

- Have people come and 'bootcamp' with security
- Embracing **transparency**
- Provides insight to daily security issues and concerns
- Build strong personal relationships
- Seed **champions** back out to the organization

Securgonomics

er·go·nom·ics

ˌɜrɡəˈnämiks/

noun

the study of people's efficiency in their working environment.

secur·go·nom·ics

/sə'kyʊɔ̃r/ gə'nämiks/

noun

the study of the efficiency of people's **security interactions** in their working environment.

Securgonomics

- Lowering the barrier to interact with security
- Too often security teams lock themselves away
- Being **accessible** & **visible** to everyone is invaluable
- Sit on the busiest office pathway you can
- Have your security dashboards front & centre

Blameless Postmortems

- Comes from our desire to have **Just Culture**
- Aim to **learn** from failings not to target blame
- Share detailed accounts of actions, decisions and circumstances **without** fear of **punishment** or **retribution**
- Empower engineers to own their own stories
- Applies to Security failures as much as Ops failures

Blameless Postmortems

'We must strive to understand that accidents don't happen because people gamble and loose. Accidents happen because the person believes that what is about to happen:

- Is not possible
- Has no connection to what they are doing
- The intended outcome is worth the risk'

Erik Hollnagel

Blameless postmortem blog post by John Allspaw:

codeascraft.com/2012/05/22/blameless-postmortems

Indicators of an Effective Security Team

Is Data Driven

- Too often security is explained with religious conviction
- Security is not black and white, many shades of **grey**
- Security is not a point but a **vector**
- Gather data to support security decisions and let it **lead** you to the correct shade of grey

Runs a Bug Bounty

- **Continuous Assessment** of your security program
 - D'ya you think you're not under attack 24/7 anyway
- Raises cost of attack for real adversaries
- Increases value from focused pentests/red teaming
- Generates good metric sets about security (data driven)

Doesn't Cry Wolf

- Verify issues before raising them to developers
- They will only chase their tail a few times before **ignoring**
- Security engineers should be in amongst the codebase
 - Aim to own the entire fix process themselves

Makes Realistic Tradeoffs

- **Not** everything is critical
- Understand impact
- Let low risk issues ship & getting commitments to a reasonable remediation window buys you lots
- **No's are a Finite Resource** - use them wisely


Provides Context & Impact

- Explaining why something is an issue and what it may result in to the team affected
- Provides security education and garners understanding
- ‘This would allow an attacker to impersonate another user & read their mail’ is useful, starts dialogues ...
- ‘Input validation was insufficiently applied’ doesn’t

Recognises & Rewards

- Rewarding folks in the org who reach out to Security
- We do this in a number of ways:
 - Pins and patches
 - T-Shirts
 - Etsy gift vouchers
 - IRC Pluses & Value Awards
 - Thanking people for raising issues


Etsy Value Awards



Recognize Sarah ✕

Send a message to Sarah and their manager (Kyle Barry) about something awesome Sarah did and why you appreciated it.

Give Sarah 1 of my 5 remaining Etsy Value Awards [What's an Etsy Value Award?](#)

 Nevermind Send

Treats Security as a BRAND

- Your security culture has real **value**
- Work long & hard to build it up
- Can however be damaged in the blink of an eye
- Aim to build strong, positive, **long term** associations with the security team org wide
- Get your peers to **buy into** security

Wrap up

Final thoughts

- Building an **effective** security organisation takes effort
- Requires a focus on **people** as much as technology
- Learn from DevOps & move to a **DevOpsSec** mindset
- **Enable** don't block, else you'll make security a NOP

Enabling. Transparent. Blameless

We're Hiring!
etsy.com/careers
(Conditions apply, see slide 40....!)

`<link />`

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